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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the several studies on the relationship between voluntary disclosure and conservatism, 
empirical findings are not conclusive. In this paper, I argue that the relation is not static but 
dynamic. I investigate the dynamic relation between voluntary disclosures and conservatism by 
examining their relation around debt financing. Debt financing can be a good natural 
experimental setting to examine the relation between voluntary disclosures and conservatism 
because both of them play an important role in reducing information asymmetry during debt 
financing. Particularly, I hypothesize that less conservative firms are more likely to increase 
voluntary disclosures around debt financing than at other times. Consistent with my hypothesis, 
empirical results show that less conservative firms are more likely to increase voluntary 
disclosures around debt financing than at other times. Overall, these results support the dynamic 
relationship between voluntary disclosures and conservatism. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts gives the benefit of lowering the effective interest rate of 
debt by reducing information asymmetry between firms and creditors. Since creditors could be 
concerned that companies withhold information that could increase the default risk of the loan, or that 
the companies are not trustworthy in the disclosures that they made, creditors depend on public information to 
monitor a firm’s default risk without biased information from borrowers (Mazumdat and Sengupta, 2005). 
Therefore, firms in anticipation of debt financing can have incentives to increase their disclosures to satisfy the 
creditors’ needs. Sengupta (1998) suggests that firms with high disclosure quality can enjoy a lower effective 
interest cost of public debt. Similarly, Mazumdat and Sengupta (2005) argue that firms try to reduce information 
asymmetry by increasing their disclosures even before private debt financing.  
 
Accounting conservatism is another method that firms have to reduce information asymmetry. Prior 
literature finds that conservatism substantial influences on a firm’s cost of debt by reducing information asymmetry 
between firms and creditors. Positive Accounting theory explains that creditors need a mechanism for mitigating the 
downside risk to maximize the probability of steady repayment and accounting conservatism is eligible to serve as 
this ‘mechanism’ (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) Empirical evidence generally supports the theoretical expectation. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that conservatism improves the efficiency of debt contracting activities, and it 
gives a benefit of lowering the interest rate to the firms. Ahmed et al. (2002) argue that conservatism gives 
borrowers benefit of better debt ratings, which imply a lower interest rate. Moerman (2006) finds that more 
conservative firms enjoy a lower bid-ask spread in the secondary market. This lower bid-ask spread imply that 
conservatism offers more information to the lenders, so it gives discount on the corresponding portion of the cost of 
debt by relaxing the information asymmetry between the lenders and borrowers. Recently, Zhang (2008) suggests 
that conservatism benefits both lenders and borrowers: ex post benefits to lenders through timely signaling of default 
risk, and ex ante benefits to borrowers through lower initial interest rates.  
 
Despite the common role in reducing information asymmetry, the relationship between conservatism and 
voluntary disclosure is still debatable. LaFond and Watts (2008) suggest that conservatism reduces the extent of 
information asymmetry by increasing the speed with which negative information is revealed in the earnings 
T 
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numbers, and thus conservatism can be a substitute for disclosures. Hui et al. (2009) provide empirical evidences on 
the substitution relationship between conservatism and management earnings forecast. On the other hand, Li and 
Zining (2008) argues that the impact of conservatism on voluntary disclosures is complementary since conservatism 
increases the probability that reported earnings will be unexpectedly low, analysts do not properly adjust for 
conservatism in their forecasts of future earnings and firms need to issue more forecasts to correct analysts’ 
forecasts. 
 
In this paper, I argue that the relation between voluntary disclosures and conservatism is not static but 
dynamic. To verify it, I investigate the dynamic relation between voluntary disclosures and accounting conservatism 
by examining their relation around debt financing. Particularly, I hypothesize that less conservative firms are more 
likely to increase voluntary disclosures around debt financing than at other times. In addition, I also examine the 
nature of the disclosures around debt financing. Since accounting conservatism is defined as a mechanism which 
forces a firm to recognize bad news quickly and good news slowly, a firm with high conservatism level would not 
need to release more bad news before debt financing to satisfy creditors’ needs for it.  
 
To test my hypotheses, I test all sample firms reporting at least one management earnings forecasts from 
1996 to 2010. I identify a firm’s level of conservatism with a firm-year conservatism measure of Khan and Watts 
(2009). Consistent with my hypothesis, the results show that less conservative firms are more likely to increase 
management earnings forecasts around debt financing than at other times. Second, more conservative firms are less 
likely to increase good news before debt financing than at other times. This result implies that the substitute relation 
between voluntary disclosures and conservatism is pronounced around debt offerings.      
 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper adds empirical evidence on the 
strategic use of either voluntary disclosures or conservatism around debt financing. Second, more importantly, this 
paper finds that firms strategically change the level of their voluntary disclosures according to their conservatism 
lever before debt financing, which means dynamic substitute relation between voluntary disclosures and 
conservatism.  
 
The reminder of this study is organized as follows. In sections 2, I review prior literature and develop my 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes sample and research methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
Section 5 summarizes and concludes this paper.   
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Voluntary Disclosures and Debt Financing 
 
Prior literature suggests that firms have incentives to increase voluntary disclosures before debt financing. 
Sengupta (1998) expects that since potential public debt holders do not have right to access borrowing firms’ 
information, which is essential to evaluate the firm’s default risk, firms with higher disclosure level would enjoy the 
lower cost of public debt. Consistent with her expectation, she finds that firms with high disclosure quality are more 
likely to have the lower yield-to-maturity and spread. Similarly, Mazumdat and Sengupta (2005) argue that firms 
financing through private debt can also enjoy the lower cost of the debt by increasing their disclosure level. They 
explain that although private lenders have direct access to inside information at their demand, private lenders are 
still attracted to voluntary disclosures because they help for private lenders to reduce information search cost. 
Moreover, in the case of asymmetric information, lenders would be concerned that companies withhold information 
that could increase the default risk of the loan or that the companies were not trustworthy in the disclosures that they 
made. Therefore, firms can use voluntary disclosures to alleviate these creditors’ concerns over withholding 
information and in turn, to obtain lower cost of private debt. Their empirical results show that firms with high 
disclosure level are more likely to have lower cost of private debt.  
 
The literature also shows that firms strategically increase their disclosures around debt offerings. Healy at 
al. (1999a) find that firms with increased analyst ratings of disclosures have an abnormally high frequency of 
subsequent public debt offers. Frankel et al. (2005) similarly find that firms are more likely to release disclosures 
before debt offerings.  
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2.2 Conservatism and Debt Financing  
 
Conservatism also has substantial influence on a firm’s cost of debt financing. Conservatism improves the 
efficiency of debt contracting activities (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) and gives borrowers the benefit of lowering 
the interest rate (Ahmed et al., 2002; Moerman, 2006; Zhang, 2008). In particular, Ahmed et al. (2002) provide 
empirical evidence that conservatism gives borrowers the benefit of better debt ratings, and in turn, firms with better 
debt ratings enjoy a lower interest rate. Moerman (2006) finds that more conservative firms enjoy a lower bid-ask 
spread in the secondary market. This lower bid-ask spread implies that conservatism offers more information to the 
lender, so it gives a discount on the corresponding portion of the cost of debt. Recently, Zhang (2008) suggests that 
conservatism benefits both lenders and borrowers: ex post benefits to lenders through timely signaling of default 
risk, and ex ante benefits to borrowers through lower initial interest rates. She argues that more conservative 
borrowers are more likely to violate debt covenants after experiencing a negative price shock. 
 
Conservatism gives the benefit of lowering the interest rate for borrowers by reducing information 
asymmetry between firms and debt holders. According to positive accounting theory, lenders are widely known to 
bear only downside risk due to the deterministic structure of debt contracts (Fischer and Verrecchia, 1997; Plummer 
and Tse, 1999). Therefore, lenders need a means for mitigating the downside risk to maximize the probability of 
steady repayment. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that lenders would require a higher return or even refuse to 
lend without a proper mechanism to credibly mitigate their risk. Positive accounting also proposes that accounting 
conservatism is appropriate to serve as this ‘mechanism’ and allows borrowers to reduce the downside risk for 
lenders. Watts (2003a, b) finds that they concentrate on the lower bounds of earnings and net asset distributions 
because of their concern with downside risk. Conservative accounting policies deliver more verifiable information 
on net assets and allow lenders to make better decisions on providing capital and to efficiently monitors the 
borrower’s ability to pay. Consequently, accounting conservatism provides mitigation to the downside risks lenders 
are bearing.  
 
2.3 Voluntary Disclosures and Conservatism  
 
Although both voluntary disclosures and conservatism play a common role in reducing information 
asymmetry between firms and creditors, the relation between them is still controversy. Some scholars insist that the 
relation between conservatism and voluntary disclosures is a substitute. They argue that conservatism may affect 
management’s forecasting strategy by altering the extent of information asymmetry between management and 
market participants. LaFond and Watts (2008) suggest that conservatism reduces the extent of information 
asymmetry by increasing the speed with which negative information is revealed in the earnings numbers. Since 
management has an incentive to overstate accounting earnings, firms reporting negative financial results are more 
reliable than those reporting positive financial results. In addition, they suggest that conservative financial 
statements are less likely to be manipulated to overstate earnings. Similarly, Li and Jing (2008) argues that 
conservatism increases the predictability of earnings by anticipating all losses, thereby reducing future uncertainty 
with regard to whether losses will be realized. Li and Jing (2008) further documents a negative relation between 
conservatism and absolute analyst forecast error, implying that conservatism increases analyst forecast accuracy. 
These findings together suggest that conservative accounting may substitute for management forecasts in reducing 
information asymmetry and the uncertainty of future earnings. A second link between conservatism and 
management’s forecasting decisions relates to legal exposure, i.e., the need to preempt the disclosure of bad news 
(Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995). By increasing the speed with which losses are recognized in earnings, 
conservatism could reduce the need to issue a preemptive forecast. This is consistent with Cahan and Zhang’s 
(2006) finding that ex-Andersen clients adopt more conservative accounting in the post-Enron period. Hui et al. 
(2009) provide empirical evidences on the substitution relationship between conservatism and management earnings 
forecast. On the other hand, Li and Zining (2008) argues that the impact of conservatism on voluntary disclosures is 
complementary. She suggests that because conservatism increases the probability that reported earnings will be 
unexpectedly low, analysts do not properly adjust for conservatism in their forecasts of future earnings. She predicts 
that firms with conservative accounting will therefore need to issue more forecasts to correct analysts’ forecasts. 
Louis et al. (2008) find consistent evidence by documenting a positive association between conservatism and 
negative forecast errors based on analysts’ initial forecasts. As a result, conservatism is shown to increase the 
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probability of a low earnings report, which would increase the need for a preemptive earnings forecast and lead to a 
positive relation between conservatism and management forecast frequency, specificity, and timeliness.  
 
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
 
To conclude the debate on the relation between voluntary disclosures and conservatism, I particularly 
consider debt financing. If the relation between voluntary disclosures and conservatism is not always substitute but it 
changes from time to time, debt financing can be a good experimental setting to figure the substitute relationships 
because both voluntary disclosures and conservatism are severely related to it. Therefore, if the relation between 
voluntary disclosures and conservatism is substitute around debt financing, less conservative firms are more likely to 
increase voluntary disclosures before debt financing as hypothesized below: 
 
H1: A firm with a lower conservatism level is more likely to increase its management forecast before debt financing 
than at other times.   
 
In addition, I examine the nature of the disclosures around debt financing. Firms tend to disclose more 
positive news (or less bad news) before debt financing because lenders examine the company’s current and past 
voluntary disclosure to determine the extent of monitoring or agency costs, and a firm has incentives to show a 
better performance record to improve its credibility. However, the nature of conservatism forces a firm to recognize 
bad news quickly and good news slowly. Therefore, if the relation between conservatism on voluntary disclosures is 
substitute, more conservative firms are less likely to increase good news before debt financing as I hypothesize 
below: 
 
H2: A firm with a higher conservatism level will be less likely to increase good news before debt financing than at 
other times. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Conservatism 
 
Although conservatism is defined as ‘a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainty and 
risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered’ in FASB No. 2, however, it is not identified by one 
generally accepted definition. Givoly and Hayn (2003) point out that the definition in FASB No.2 fails to either 
present the nature of ‘prudent reaction’ or explain how such a ‘reaction’ may ensure that risks are ‘adequately 
considered’. In practice, accounting conservatism is widely referred to as allowing the recognition of losses quickly 
and gains slowly to ensure that all uncertainties are properly applied in the financial reports, and stating gains at the 
least optimistic estimate amount.  
 
Particularly, I use the firm-year measure of Khan and Watts (2009). They suggest that firms with longer 
investment cycles, higher idiosyncratic uncertainty and higher information asymmetry have higher accounting 
conservatism. This measure captures the information asymmetry by using market-to-book ratio, firm size, leverage, 
and other variables. Although conservatism has been considered as a constant (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Zhang, 
2008), many researchers have expressed the need for a firm-level measure of conservatism that can reflect the 
timing of changes in conservatism and the variation of conservatism across firms within an industry. This firm-year 
measure successfully meets the researchers’ demand. In particular, C-score, a proxy for firm-year measure of 
conservatism, is estimated from the annual cross-sectional regression model.  
 
3.2 Voluntary Disclosures 
 
In many different kinds of voluntary disclosures, I focus on management earnings forecasts as voluntary 
disclosures because they are known to contain most appropriate information when lenders evaluate a firm’s 
downside risk, comparing to other forms of voluntary disclosures. The primary data source for management 
earnings disclosures is First Call Historical database (FCHD). Since FCHD started to record firms’ voluntary 
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disclosures from 2006, my sample period also starts from 2006. I count the frequency of management earnings 
forecasts in every fiscal year.  
 
3.3 Debt Financing Data and Sample Selection 
 
I identify debt financing by using the Standard & Poor’s Compustat North America Industrial Annual File 
database. Because firms are not expected to pay the reputational cost of increasing disclosures after debt financing 
for short-term borrowings, I consider only long-term debt financing. Specifically, long-terms debt financing is 
identified with code, DLTIS. The item includes (1) increase in long-term and short-term debt when combined, (2) 
long-term debt issued for or assumed in an acquisition, (3) proceeds from bonds, capitalized lease obligations, or 
note obligations, and (4) reclassification of current debt to long-term debt. I exclude firm-years which are not 
identified with the code. I also exclude finance and utility firms (i.e., firms with Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes of 4000–4999 and 6000–6999) as their capital structure differs from traditional manufacturing firms. 
Firms which issue or split their stock are also excluded as such events are known to affect a firm’s disclosure 
policy. I also exclude firm-years without control variables which is known to affect a firm’s disclosure policy. In 
addition, I exclude firm-years releasing no disclosures during the entire sample period 1996-2010, assuming that 
those firms would seldom use disclosures as a vehicle for disclosing their future earnings information. Finally, I 
exclude firm-years which do not have a C-score. As a result, I test total 2,520 firms and 9,166 firm-years. This 
procedure is summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Sample selection process 
Selection criteria Number of firm-years left in the sample 
Number of firms in the 
sample 
Firms issuing long-term debt at least once in 1996-2010. 124,960 27,647 
Less: firm-years issuing or splitting a stock 2,371 87 
Less: financing and utility firms    15,921 3,302 
Less: firm-years without control variables 66,223 16,400 
 37,451 8,218    
Less: firm-years of firms without c-score  20,460 3,701 
Less: firm-years of firms reporting zero disclosure 7,825 1,947 
TOTAL 9,166 2,570 
 
3.4 Research model 
 
To test my hypothesis, I estimate an ordinary least square (OLS) regression model (1) as described below. 
Dependent variable,ΔMF, is one-year change in the frequency of management earnings forecasts. 
 ∆𝑀𝐹!" =𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚!" + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡!" ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚!" + 𝛽!log  (𝑀𝑉)!" + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛!" +𝛽!𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑠 + 𝛽!log  (𝑁𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡)!" + 𝛽!𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑔!" + 𝛽!"𝑀/𝐵!" + 𝜀!"           (1) 
 
 
where Debt is a dummy variable whose value equals to 1 if a firm issues long-term debt during the fiscal year (t) and 
0 otherwise. Conservatism indicates a firm’s level of conservatism measured by Khan and Watts (2009)’s C-score. 
My main independent variable of interest is the interaction term between Conservatism and Debt 
(Debt*Conservatism). As H1 postulates that a firm with a lower conservatism level are more likely to increase 
management forecast before debt financing, I expect negative coefficient on the interaction term (β3 <0).  
 
Following Nagar et al. (2003), I control for various factors which is known to affect the cost or benefit of 
issuing a forecast. MV is equity market value. I use the natural logarithm of MV since the variable is highly skewed. 
Return is the annual CRSP stock returns and StdReturn is the annual variability of the stock returns. BadNews is a 
binary variable whose value equals 1 if a firm experiences a negative annual CRSP stock return in the firm-year and 
0 otherwise. The number of analyst followings, NAnalyst, is also controlled since it represents both analysts’ 
information demands and firm-level disclosure tendencies. I convert it to logarithmic number because it is highly 
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skewed. Also, I include the number of business segments, NSeg, as reported in the 1997 version of Compustat 
Segment. NSeg is included to control for a firm’s complexity. M/B is a market-to-book ratio which proxies for the 
information asymmetry between management and investors.  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of variables used in Equation (1). In the table, the mean of ΔMF are 
greater at debt financing year than at other times, which implies that firms are more likely to increase their 
disclosure level around debt financing than at other times. C-Score is lower at debt financing years than at other 
times. Although prior studies argue that firms with high conservatism level can enjoy lower cost of debt, this result 
may imply that firms want to deliver more good news quickly than bad news right before debt financing given that 
their conservatism level are already evaluated in the past. The descriptive statistics of control variables are similar to 
prior literature arguing that debt financing is a good signal to stock market. That is, log(MV), Return, log(NAnalyst), 
NSeg are greater at debt financing years than at other times while StdReturn, Badnews, and M/B are lower at debt 
financing years than at other times.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Debt financing years Non-Debt financing years Variables N Mean Median Std. N Mean Median Std. 
Dependent Variable  
ΔMF 5,099 1.302 1.000 4.020 4,067 1.070 1.000 4.062 
Conservatism Measures  
C-Score 5,099 0.067 0.072 0.088 4,067 0.087 0.096 0.074 
Independent Variables  
log(MV) 5,099 3.034 0.674 3.127 4,067 2.884 2.945 0.658 
Return 5,099 25.540 21.370 19.210 4,067 20.912 16.380 17.838 
StdReturn 5,099 0.200 0.170 0.145 4,067 0.255 0.215 0.196 
BadNews 5,099 0.396 0.000 0.489 4,067 0.398 0.000 0.490 
log(NAnalyst) 5,099 2.143 2.302 0.907 4,067 2.046 2.197 0.954 
NSeg 5,099 3.333 3.000 1.821 4,067 2.784 2.000 1.432 
M/B 5,099 0.097 0.102 4.774 4,067 0.311 0.139 8.682 
 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlation among variables used in the main regression model. Dependent variable 
(ΔMF) is positively correlated with Debt and the correlation is statistically significant. It means that firms are more 
likely to increase the frequency of management earnings forecasts around debt offerings. Consistent with the view 
of Hui et al. (2008), the correlation between ΔMF and C-score is negative and it is statistically significant. The other 
correlation between ΔMF and control variables are generally consistent with Nagar et al. (2003). That is, log(MV), 
Return, NAnalyst, and NSeg are positively correlated with ΔMF while StdReturn, Badnews, M/B are negatively 
correlated with ΔMF.  
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Table 3. Pearson correlation 
Variables ΔMF Debt C-Score log(MV) Return StdReturn Badnews Log (NAnalyst) NSeg M/B 
 ΔMF 1                    
Debt 0.029 1         (0.006)          
C-Score -0.049 -0.117 1        (<.0001) (<.0001)         
log(MV) 0.100 0.111 -0.594 1       (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)        
Return 0.117 0.123 -0.46 0.725 1      (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)       
StdReturn -0.046 -0.161 0.200 -0.335 -0.301 1     (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)      
BadNews -0.028 -0.001 -0.025 -0.083 -0.030 0.035 1    (0.008) (0.885) (0.018) (<.0001) (0.005) (0.001)     
Log(Nanalyst) 0.120 0.052 -0.548 0.605 0.467 -0.146 0.004 1   (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.699)    
NSeg 0.039 0.162 -0.298 0.289 0.258 -0.162 -0.070 0.143 1  (0.001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)   
M/B -0.006 -0.016 0.009 -0.004 -0.009 0.013 0.008 -0.009 0.008 1 (0.579) (0.135) (0.388) (0.717) (0.403) (0.219) (0.446) (0.399) (0.462)  
Note: The sample size is 9,166. The p-values are in parentheses. 
 
4.2 Multivariate test 
 
Table 4 represents my OLS regression results. It shows that the estimated coefficients on Debt is 
significantly positive at one percentage significance level. Consistent with prior studies, it implies that debt 
financing gives firms incentives to increase their disclosure level before debt financing. Contrast to my expectation, 
the coefficient on Conservatism is significantly positive. However, the positive effect of conservatism on a firm’s 
disclosure policy is mitigated around debt financing. In other words, as seen the negative coefficient on the 
interaction term between Debt and Conservatism, the relation between voluntary disclosures and conservatism 
change from complementary to substitute relationship around debt financing.  
 
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with my expectations. Particular, ΔMF is 
positively related to Return and log(NAnalyst) while it is negatively related to StdReturn and NSeg. However, 
consistent with my expectation, the coefficient on MV is significantly negative. 
 
Table 4. Multivariate Analysis 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient (t-value) 
Intercept  -0.49 (-1.46) Debt (+) 0.37*** (3.07) 
Conservatism (-) 4.65*** (4.81) 
Debt*Conservatism (-) -3.10*** (-2.96) 
Controls    log(MV) (+) -0.06 (-0.53) 
Return (+) 0.02*** (5.80) 
StdReturn (-) -0.27 (-1.04) 
Badnews (-) -0.19** (-2.20) 
log(Nanalyst) (+) 0.49*** (8.19) 
NSeg (-) 0.03 (1.01) 
M/B (-) -0.01 (-0.41) 
N  9,166  Pseudo R2  0.022   
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4.3 Matching 
 
To control for systematic difference between debt financing years and non-debt financing years, I matched 
debt financing years with non-debt financing years to have similar size, same industry, and same fiscal year-end. 
Through this matching process, I obtain 600 pairs.  
 
Table 5 presents the regression results with matched sample. It shows that the negative coefficient on the 
interaction term between Debt and Conservatism remains significantly. The signs of other variables are also similar 
to those in Table 4 but their statistic significances are not strong.  
 
Table 5. Matched Sample 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficients (t-value) 
Intercept  0.07 (0.06) Debt (+) 0.24 (0.69) 
Conservatism (-) 5.65 (1.34) 
Debt*Conservatism (-) -4.32** (-2.04) 
Controls    log(MV) (+) 0.04 (0.10) 
Return (+) 0.02** (2.21) 
StdReturn (-) -0.52 (-0.43) 
BadNews (-) -0.28 (-1.06) 
log(NAnalyst) (+) 0.13 (0.74) 
NSeg (-) -0.03 (-0.31) 
M/B (-) -0.16 (-0.26) 
N  1,200  Pseudo R2  -0.0014   
4.4 Good News vs Bad News 
 
Additionally, I examine the nature of disclosures around debt financing and its relation with accounting 
conservatism. As I hypothesize in H2, although firms tend to disclose more positive news (or less bad news) before 
debt financing, accounting conservatism is defined as a policy that forces a firm to recognize bad news quickly and 
good news slowly. Therefore, if the relation between conservatism on voluntary disclosures is substitute, more 
conservative firms are less (more) likely to increase bad news (good news) around debt financing.  
 
To classify each management earnings forecast as either good news or bad news, I use code in FCHD, 
CIGCODED. The item indicates whether the voluntary disclosure qualifies as a positive or negative surprise. If a 
management earnings forecasts is higher than analysts’ consensus, it is classified as a positive surprise and 
otherwise, it is classified as a negative surprise. Next, I annually calculate the ratio of good news to total 
management earnings forecasts. Dependent variable in this test is one-year change in the ratio of good news. 
Independent variables are the same with those in previous tests. If H2 is true, the coefficient on the interaction term 
between Debt and Conservatism would be insignificant.  
 
Table 6 presents the regression results with one-year change in the ratio of good news as a dependent 
variable. It shows that the coefficient on Conservatism is significantly negative but the coefficient on the interaction 
term between Debt and Conservatism is not statistically significant. This result implies that although firms with 
higher conservatism level tend to release more bad news, the tendency disappears around debt financing.   
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Table 6. Good news vs Bad news 
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficients (t-value) 
Intercept  0.03 (2.10) Debt (+) 0.01 (0.47) 
Conservatism (-) -0.07* (-1.72) 
Debt*Conservatism (-) -0.04 (-0.79) 
Controls    log(MV) (+) -0.01 (-0.18) 
Return (+) 0.01 (1.15) 
StdReturn (-) 0.03** (-1.99) 
BadNews (+) 0.03*** (7.46) 
log(NAnalyst) (+) 0.01 (1.34) 
NSeg (-) -0.01*** (-2.63) 
M/B (-) -0.01 (-1.41) 
N  7,345  Pseudo R2  0.014   
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper examines the dynamic relationship between voluntary disclosures and accounting conservatism. 
I find that firms with less conservatism level are more likely to increase their voluntary disclosures around debt 
financing. It implies that the relations between voluntary disclosures and accounting conservatism is not static but 
dynamic. Specifically, the relation between voluntary disclosures and accounting conservatism seems to be 
complementary but it becomes substitute around debt financing. In addition, I examine the nature of the voluntary 
disclosures around debt financing and I find that firms with higher conservatism levels do not necessarily increase 
good news, possibly due to the limitation on their conservatism level.   
 
Despite the several contribution of this paper, it also has some limitations. Due to the limitation on data 
access, I could not identify the exact date of debt financing. I expect that the substitute relation between voluntary 
disclosures and accounting conservatism becomes much stronger right before debt financing. Also, could not 
identify the amount of debt financing. If there is substitute relation between voluntary disclosures and conservatism 
in reducing information asymmetry around debt financing, the relation would be stronger as the amount of debt 
financing increases.  
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